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THE KENTUCKY DIVORCE VENUE STATUTE: A
CALL FOR REFORM
INTRODUCTION
The venue of a case is defined as "the place of trial, the
particular county or territorial area, within the state or district
in which the cause is7 properly brought or tried."' In 1852, the
Kentucky General Assembly enacted a statute providing that
venue for divorce actions in the Commonwealth shall be in the
county of the wife's residence. 2 While the numerical designa-
tion of the statute has changed several times over the past 125
years,3 the substance and impact of the statute remain the
same.4 This comment examines that statute on venue in di-
vorce actions in three general sections. The first section ex-
plores the social and legal environment of divorce when the
statute was enacted in 1852 and compares that environment
with the status of divorce in the Commonwealth today, espe-
cially in light of Kentucky's 1972 reform of the divorce laws.5
The second section examines the Kentucky approach to venue
in divorce suits in comparison with that of other states. The
third and final section examines potential constitutional chal-
lenges to the statute, specifically under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. As will become evi-
dent, while the statute may once have had an important pur-
pose, it no longer serves a viable function in divorce actions in
the Commonwealth today and should be reformed.
Stevens, Venue Reform in Kentucky-A Proposal, 40 Ky. L.J. 58, 59 (1951).
2 This statute was originally enacted in the 1851-52 session. Revised Statutes of
Kentucky, ch. 47, art. III, § iv (1860).
Under various statutory compilations, the basic provisions of this statute have
appeared in the following: General Statutes, ch. 52, art. 3, § 4 (1873); Carroll's Ken-
tucky Statutes Annotated, § 2120 (1936); Carroll's Kentucky Codes, § 76 (1932); and
currently Ky. REV. STAT. § 452.470 (1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
I KRS § 452.470 (1975) provides: "An action for alimony or divorce must be
brought in the county where the wife usually resides, if she have an actual residence
in this state; if not, in the county of the husband's residence."
For clarity, all references in the text will be to the modem section.
5 KRS §§ 403.010-.350 (1972).
COMMENTS
I. RATIONALE OF THE DIVORCE VENUE STATUTE
A. Historical Background
When the Kentucky General Assembly adopted the di-
vorce venue provision in 1852,6 it was primarily in response to
the social, economic and legal status of women. That the stat-
ute was designed for the convenience of women is fairly clear,
and one court recognized this in stating:
The real object, we have no doubt, was to so regulate the
jurisdiction as to subserve the convenience and possibly the
interest of the wife by making the jurisdiction local to that
county in which she should, at the time of the commence-
ment of the suit have an actual residence.7
This early interpretation of legislative intent has not been re-
futed, and has in fact been expressly followed in subsequent
cases." For a clear understanding of why the Kentucky legisla-
ture felt compelled to enact a statute protecting women, it is
necessary to examine the position of married women in the
mid-nineteenth century, the legal doctrines affecting them,
and the typical divorce case for which the statute was designed.
In the mid-nineteenth century, a woman's position was
defined solely in terms of her status as a wife and mother.9 A
woman was merely an extension of her husband and "was ex-
pected to embrace her husband's religion, to confine her activi-
ties to the home and make her husband's pleasure her guiding
star. Ignorant of her husband's business, subordinate in the
church, banned from politics and possessing a scanty or silly
education. . ",0 a woman was wholly dependent on her hus-
band.
Legally, as well as economically, a woman had no individ-
When the statute was enacted, the venue provision was part of the entire statute
dealing with divorce; it was not separately codified as it is today.
7 Johnson v. Johnson, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 485, 488 (1877).
1 See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 209 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1919); Cummings v.
Cummings, 117 S.W. 289 (Ky. 1909); Gooding v. Gooding, 42 S.W. 1123 (Ky. 1897).
1 "There can be no doubt that our nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an atti-
tude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal,
but in a cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
10 2 A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMEmc FAMILY 83 (1918).
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ual position." The husband "held the external powers of the
family with reference to property. .... [The wife] could not
sue alone, nor execute a deed or other instrument to bind her-
self and property. . . .She forfeited all personal control over
her property so long as the marriage lasted." 2 With the wife
totally dependent on her husband, it seems clear why the legis-
lature in 1852 felt that if the husband was leaving his wife, she
needed the protection of a venue statute which forced the di-
vorce to be litigated in her home county.
Insofar as particular legal doctrines operating in 1852 con-
tributed to the statute's design, divorce and alimony actions' 3
at that time were separate claims and could be filed indepen-
dently.'4 While alimony as an action separate from divorce was
clearly recognized in Kentucky for many years,'5 today the ac-
tion has been abolished.'6
" Id. at 91. "The reality of woman's bondage is made vivid by a case in New York
City in which a husband recovered ten thousand dollars damages from persons that
had . . . sheltered his wife after she left him." Id.
12 Id. at 93.
" M. PAULSEN, W. WADLINGTON, & J. GOEBEL, DoMESTic RELATIONS-CASES AND
MATmALS 416-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PAULSEN] gives a discussion of the two
types of divorces available to a married couple. Divorce a mensa et thoro was a partial
divorce which did not extinguish any right or responsibilities attached to the marriage
bond, or give freedom to remarry. Divorce a vinculo was an absolute divorce, and in
early times was granted infrequently and only under extreme circumstances. This
system developed in the English divorce system and was generally adopted in the
United States. For a complete discussion of the history of divorce in the United States
see N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO (1962). Alimony was basically a remedy provided by
the English courts in a divorce a mensa et thoro, based on the husband's common law
duty to support his wife. For a concise discussion of alimony and its history, see H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsnC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1968).
" R. PETrLLI, KENTUcKY FAMILY LAW § 25.27 (1969): "By statute of 1812...
wives could sue and recover alimony without divorce." Note, when the Civil Code of
Practice was operating in Kentucky, there were special forms for alimony suits alone.
See Carroll's Kentucky Codes (1932), forms 149., 150-1., 151. See note 20, infra for
Petrilli's comment on the separation of alimony and divorce actions.
There are several reasons a wife might choose to file for alimony but not for
divorce. The main reason is that a wife who was divorced had to give up her dower
interest in the husband's property. 28 C.J.S. Dower § 53 (1941). Other possible reasons
include a hope for reconciliation or simply distaste for the stigmas attached to divorce
in the mid-nineteenth century. Finally, a wife might limit her action to alimony if the
legal requirements for divorce could not be met.
" Breen v. Breen, 91 S.W. 251 (Ky. 1906).
,' R. PETRILu, supra note 14, at § 25.27 (Supp. 1974): "[lIt is a reasonable
conclusion that an action for alimony no longer exists. . . ." Professor Petrilli notes
that "dissolution; legal separation; maintenance following dissolution; or, divorce from
bed and board [are] now to be substituted." Id.
COMMENTS
The fact that actions for alimony and divorce could be
filed separately was closely related to the concept of abandon-
ment.17 Abandonment, as it developed, was not limited to de-
sertion. The husband could legally abandon the wife by treat-
ing her in such a manner as to force her to leave him-in effect
constructive abandonment.18 Part of the reason the venue stat-
ute was structured to favor the wife was the assumption that
if the wife filed only for alimony, the husband was at fault for
abandoning her either physically or constructively because the
wife could not file for alimony unless she and her husband were
living separately.
Moreover, since most wives in this period were not eco-
nomically independent, " their mobility was more limited than
the husband's. The venue statute took account of this situation
and allowed the wife to file her action wherever she resided
after separation from her husband.
The cases involving the venue statute present a clear and
regular pattern of events: The husband abandons the wife,
either literally or constructively, and the wife seeks refuge in
the home of friends or relatives. 2° For example in Williamson
v. Williamson,2' the wife left her husband when he mistreated
her children from a previous marriage. The wife took the chil-
dren to her former home in Pike County. 2  In her subsequent
11 This relationship is evidenced by one of the earliest divorce and alimony stat-
utes in Kentucky. See W. Lrrr.L, DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF KENTUCKY, ch. 1, §
1 (1822). That statute, entitled "Abandonment," gave the wife the right to sue for
alimony, and ultimately divorce, if her husband abandoned her for a religious sect
which required him to renunciate the marriage covenent, such as the Shakers.
,1 Williamson v. Williamson, 209 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1919); Lockridge v. Lockridge, 33
Ky. (3 Dana) 28 (1835). The wife, having left the husband because of cruel treatment,
was labeled "abandoned."
" See discussion in text accompanying notes 9 through 12, supra, for a- brief
historical analysis of the legal and financial positions of women in the nineteenth
century.
" E.g., Luvall v. Luvall, 15 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1929); Miller v. Miller, 133 S.W. 588
(Ky. 1911); Steele v. Steele, 29 S.W. 17 (Ky. 1895); Hulett v. Hulett, 80 Ky. 364 (1882);
Lockridge v. Lockridge, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 28 (1835).
i, 209 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1919).
" This pattern of the wife leaving the husband for a new residence is still evident
although the wife today may rent her own apartment instead of moving in with her
family. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Peek, 419 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1967) and Whitaker v. Bradley,
349 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1961). This change by itself indicates that women are no longer
as financially dependent on their husbands as in the past and that they are capable of
providing their own necessities.
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suit for alimony, the court stated: "[A] suit for alimony may
be maintained independent of and without regard to a divorce,
where the husband treats the wife with cruelty and compels her
to leave him. . . and although the abandonment may not have
continued long enough to entitle her to a divorce." 23 In another
case where the husband abandoned the wife, the court ex-
plained that "the only place she had to go was the house of her
father .... ,,2" Obviously, the courts were as aware of the limi-
tations imposed on women as was the legislature when they
enacted the venue statute.
B. The New Kentucky Law on Dissolution
The legal status of women has changed today. One signifi-
cant change-came in 1972 when Kentucky adopted the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. 25 This Act radically changed both
the substantive and procedural requirements of a divorce ac-
tion.26 The most significant change wrought by the Act is that
a couple need no longer prove particular grounds for divorce.
Under the old law, depending upon which party filed for the
divorce, grounds to be alleged included, among others, impo-
tence, abandonment, adultery, cruel and inhuman treatment,
or insanity.27 In contrast, the sole basis for dissolution under
2 209 S.W. at 504. The court here reiterated the legislative intent expressed in
Johnson v. Johnson, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 485 (1877), which is quoted in text accompany-
ing note 7, supra.
2 Steele v. Steele, 29 S.W. 17, 17 (Ky. 1895).
2 NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON'UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE AcT 177 (1970); codified in Kentucky at KRS § 403.010-.350 (1977). For a
complete discussion of the new divorce laws, see Note, Kentucky's New Dissolution of
Marriage Law, 61 Ky. L.J. 980 (1973) and Comment, Kentucky Divorce Reform, 12 J.
FAM. L. 109 (1973). And, for a discussion of no-fault divorce, see generally New Topic
Service AM. JUR. 2d, No-Fault Divorce (1977).
" However, some commentators caution against complete acceptance of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act. See Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 18
S.D.L. REv. 572, 576 (1973):
In the past, the varied patterns of divorce throughout the United States and
the gap between statutory law and the "living law" of divorce have been such
that it was difficult to achieve a consensus. Today, however, there is over-
whelming public support for more realistic laws of divorce, and the danger
may be that state legislatures may tend to accept any product which is
offered that comes along with reputable sponsorship.
v KRS § 403.020 (1970) (repealed 1972). The divorce laws of the United States
have been criticized for many years:
James (later Lord) Bryce, a keen observer of American life at the turn of this
[Vol. 66
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the new Act is irretrievable breakdown.3
The new Act also provides that either spouse may receive
maintenance support, 9 while under previous law only the wife
had such a right." This Act has also equalized the division of
property provisions.' Today, it is the party most deserving of
financial support who will receive it; no longer is there the
presumption that the wife alone is the party in need.
These changes in the divorce laws indicate a legislative
awareness not only of the needs of the law to deal with modem
reality, but also of the inequalities inherent in the older law.
Putting men and women on an equal basis in a given legal
situation often necessitates major statutory reform.32 In replac-
century remarked in 1901 that our various state legislative formulations for
divorce constituted "the largest and the strangest, and perhaps the saddest,
body of legislative experiments in the sphere of family law which free, self-
governing communities have ever tried."
PAULSEN, supra hote 13, at 419.
2 KRS § 403.170 (Supp. 1976) provides:
(1) If both of the parties by petition or otherwise have stated under oath or
affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably broken, or one of the parties
has so stated and the other has not denied it, the court, after hearing, shall
make a finding whether the marriage is irretrievably broken ...
(3) A finding of irretrievable breakdown is a determination that there is no
reasonable prospect of reconciliation.
KRS § 403.110 (Supp. 1976) states: "This chapter shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to:
(5) Make the law of legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities
of matrimonial experience by making irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relation-
ship the sole basis for its dissolution."
1 KRS § 403.200 (Supp. 1976) provides: "(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or legal separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of
a marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the
court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse."
3 KRS § 403.060 (1970) (repealed 1972).
3, Compare KRS § 403.060 (1970) (repealed 1972) with KRS § 403.190 (Supp.
1976).
1" See Foster, supra note 26, at 576-77, where the author states:
[R]ealism impels us to acknowledge that statutory provisions have minimal
impact upon th6 stability of marriage and that economic conditions, psy-
chological tensions, and the increasing independence of women, changes in
religious attitude, high mobility, urban anonymity, and other factors all
have more to do with marriage stability and the incidence of divorce than
does the statutory framework. This does not mean, however, that marriage
and divorce law need not express a sound public policy, nor that statutory
terms are largely irrelevant.
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ing standards based on out-dated beliefs with workable princi-
ples formulated to reflect current ideas, the legislature keeps
up with a changing society.3 However, even in light of changed
laws, the venue statute on divorce remains the same. It would
seem that this venue statute is a remnant of the mid-
nineteenth century, when the condition of women and the ex-
isting legal doctrines were very different from today.34 The as-
sumption that women have no alternatives for financial sup-
port except their husbands has for the most part been rejected
by society35 as well as the law.38 If it is indeed the intent of the
Kentucky legislature to base the laws of this state on "the
realities of matrimonial experience, 317 the venue statute should
be reformed to conform with the new egalitarian divorce laws.
II. VENUE IN OTHER STATES COMPARED To KENTUCKY
Divorce is characterized as a transitory action,3 and in
general the venue for transitory actions is determined by the
court which has jurisdiction over the defendant. 39 Other states
define the venue in a divorce action to allow the suit to be
11 R. SUMMERS, A. CAMPBELL & G. HUBBARD, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: UNrr
III LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGES 17 (1974):
Indeed, social stability through law has such value that most societies, in-
cluding our own, have set up lawmaking machinery that tends to favor
leaving things as they are (the status quo) rather than change. Indeed, it
often seems that our legal institutions-legislatures, regulatory agencies,
courts-are terribly slow to make changes in the law that reflect the changing
needs and values of American society.
3, See discussion in text accompanying notes 13 through 18, supra, on the prior
availability of maintaining separate actions for alimony and divorce.
31 N. BLAKE, supra note 13, at 227. In discussing divorce in the modem context,
the author states, "The modem wife was less in awe of her husband, expected better
treatment, and was quicker to seek relief in the divorce court than her grandmother
had been. She was also less dependent economically on her husband and readier to
take her chances on self-support." Id.
"6 See discussion of recent legislative reforms promoting sexual equality in text
accompanying notes 64 through 72, infra.
31 KRS § 403.110(5) (Supp. 1976), stating a purpose for which the Kentucky
General Assembly adopted the No-Fault Divorce Act.
11 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 83 (1959). Contrast this concept with local actions which
arise in only one place. See also 77 AM. JUR. 2d Venue § 2 (1975).
11 Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1217 (1930): "An
accepted criterion is.whether the action is one that might have happened anywhere. If
so it is transitory. . . .Local actions can be tried only where they arise; transitory
actions in whatever court has jurisdiction over the defendant or his property."
COMMENTS
brought in the county of the plaintiff's residence," the county
of the defendant's residence or where he may be found,4' or the
county where either party resides.42 Some states have special
provisions allowing the suit to be brought where the defendant
does business" or where the couple resided last before separa-
tion." Kentucky is the only jurisdiction which rejects the usual
criteria for venue, placing it exclusively in the county of the
wife's residence whether she be plaintiff or defendant.
Aside from the fact that no other state currently seems to
recognize the rationale behind Kentucky's divorce venue stat-
ute, 5 there are other reasons the Kentucky statute should be
revised to adopt the general venue criteria used in other states.
While Kentucky has recently reformed both its divorce laws"
and court system, 7 the entire venue code has been operating
since 1852.11 The venue provisions now require some attention:
11 ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-401 (13) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1204 (1962); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 395 (West 1973); HAW. REv. STAT. § 580-1 (1968); KAN. STAT. § 60-
607 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.09 (West Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Rule
3(b)(9) (Page Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-13 (Supp. 1976); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1995(16) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
" ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 6-3-2 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.030 (1976); COLO. REv.
STAT. Rule 98(c) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.011 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-
4301 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-404 (1948); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1621 (Supp.
1977-78); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-5-1 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2 A 34-8 (West Supp.
1977-78); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-04-05 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-13-7 (1953); VA.
CODE § 20-96 (Supp. 1970); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.12.025 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-8
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.50 (West 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 1-37 (1959).
42 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-42 (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1507 (1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1976); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-6 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.2 (West Supp. 1977-78); LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3941 (West 1961); ME. REv.
STAT. tit. 4, § 155 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 30 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
208, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.300 (Vernon 1977);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-2904 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-348 (1974); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 125.020 (1975); N.H. REv. STAT. AN. § 458:9 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-
3 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 503 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1272.1 (West Supp. 1976-77); OR. REv. STAT. § 14.070 (1975); S.C. CODE § 20-106
(1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-30.1 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-804 (1977);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 593 (1974).
42 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1621 (Supp. 1977-78).
"MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE §
20-106 (1962).
" See text accompanying note 7, supra, for a statement of that rationale.
, For a discussion of the new divorce laws, see text accompanying notes 25
through 31, supra.
17 KRS chaps. 21-34 (Supp. 1976).
19 Fortune, Venue of Civil Actions in Kentucky, 60 Ky. L.J. 497, 500 (1971): "The
1978]
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In order for the new court system to operate at maximum effi-
ciency, the regulation of venue should have an "emphasis on
simplicity and Tairness to the litigants."49 Confining the proper
venue for divorce actions to the county of the wife's residence
promotes neither simplicity, efficiency nor fairness.
Insofar as a venue statute should operate to promote sim-
plicity and efficiency, the Kentucky statute has failed as it
generates confusing interpretive problems in determining the
county of the wife's residence. Since residence has been defined
as actual residence rather than legal residence," the wife's in-
tent to establish a new residence is a significant factor.-' This
interpretation has in turn led to questions of what constitutes
intent, 2 and what length of time serves to establish actual
residence.," For example in Martin v. Fuqua,54 the wife moved
from one county to another. Two days later, both the husband
and wife filed for divorce, the husband in the county where they
had previously lived together and the wife in the county of her
new residence.55 Since the courts in both counties accepted the
case, and indeed came to opposite conclusions, the case was
appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The Court of Ap-
peals ruled in favor of the wife, since the question of venue was
reached first in her action, but the case illustrates the confu-
sion generated when venue is determined on the basis of the
wife's intent to establish an actual residence.
If the statute fails to promote efficiency and simplicity,
neither does it promote fairness. Fairness is not served by a
statute so inflexible that it allows no leeway for a case-by-case
venue code was designed for practice in 1851, not 1951, and had not been particularly
inspired in the beginning."
Id. at 559.
" Gross v. Ward, 386 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1965).
, Brumfield v. Baxter, 210 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1948). The court held that the facts
presented ample proof that a woman who had lived in the county for five days intended
to change her residence.
52 Steward v. Yager, 272 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1954) (where wife removed only one-half
or her personal belongings to another county, the court held she had not abandoned
her old residence.)
Carter v. Carter, 273 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. 1954) (one day was held sufficient).
539 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1976).
The wife's intent to establish residence was based on minimal and conflicting
facts. Cf. Calhoun v. Peek, 419 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1967) (court inferred wife's intent to
establish new residence in Calloway County even though wife still worked in Trigg
County and brought her children daily to Trigg County schools).
[Vol. 66
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approach or the presence of special circumstances." Moreover,
it seems fairly clear that the statute operates to give the wife
an advantage. 5
Professor William Fortune has suggested a possible re-
form; it is his view that "[c]ases involving status [e.g., di-
vorce suits] would be proper in the county of the defendant's
residence or in the county in which the status exists. This
would have the effect of permitting a divorce action to be filed
in the county of bona fide residence of either husband or
wife."58 Professor Fortune further suggests that the legislature
might fear that a revised statute would "prompt an unseemly
race to the courthouse. ' 59 However, if an unseemly race to the
courthouse is the legislature's primary reservation against
adopting the usual venue approach, it is ironic because the
current Kentucky approach encourages just such a race, al-
though it is a race to define the county of the wife's residence.
Burke v. Tartar"0 provides an extreme example. In Burke, the
wife left her husband early in the morning on June 23, 1961.
She drove from her home in Pulaski County to Lexington, in
Fayette County, where she rented an apartment. Later that
day she filed for divorce in Fayette County. Meanwhile, the
husband had filed his divorce action in Pulaski County at 9:30
a.m. The court held that since the husband's suit was filed
before the wife could establish an actual residence in Fayette
County, the proper venue was Pulaski County. It seems that
had the husband been slower or the wife quicker, the results
would have been quite different." This case is clearly extreme,
" An extreme example would be where a couple lives in Paducah and the wife
leaves the husband and moves to Ashland. In order either to initiate or answer a
divorce suit, the husband would have to travel approximately 350 miles to appear in
court. Professor Petrilli suggests that the courts may not apply the venue statute as
rigidly as in the past if the wife is not economically dependent on the husband. Tele-
phone conversation with Professor Petrilli (October 10, 1977).
Although the advantages to the wife may not necessarily be substantial in terms
of the outcome of the litigation, the wife's access to the forum and to her attorney
would undoubtedly create less of a hardship for her in the amount of time, energy, and
money expended than it would for the husband forced to maintain the action away
from his own residence.
-" Fortune, supra note 48, at 561.
' d.
350 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1961).
" Cf. Martin v. Fuqua, 539 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1976), where husband and wife filed
suit on the same day, but wife, having moved to another county the day before, was
1978]
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but the fact remains that the current statute does engender its
own race to the courthouse.
H. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE VENUE STATUTE
In 1972, the House of Representatives of the General As-
sembly of Kentucky passed a proposal directing the Legislative
Research Commission (LRC) to undertake a comprehensive
study of Kentucky statutes with regard to sex discrimination. 2
The proposal was impelmented by the LRC and in 1974 the
revisions were incorporated into the laws of the state.13 Al-
though the original proposal stated, "the General Assembly
recognizes its responsibility to the women of Kentucky and
reaffirms its committment to the principle of equality for all,"'64
the changes made by the LRC indicate that men as well as
women were being discriminated against in certain areas of the
law.6" One example of this discrimination against men was a
statute dealing with exemptions of inheritable interests. In the
considered a resident of that county.
12 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 381.
A JOINT RESOLUTION directing the Legislative Research Commission to
undertake a comprehensive study of Kentucky laws with regard to sex dis-
crimination.
WHEREAS, the General Assembly, by numerous enactments of law,
has affirmed its commitment to the equality and civil rights of all persons;
and
WHEREAS, the public and its representatives are cognizant of the ex-
istence of discrimination on the basis of sex in many areas; and
WHEREAS, the existence of sex discrimination is often authorized or
mandated by law, including laws of this Commonwealth; and
WHEREAS, the General Assembly recognizes its responsibility to the
women of Kentucky and reaffirms its commitment to the principle of equal-
ity for all;
NOW THEREFORE,
Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky:
SECTION 1. That the Legislative Research Commission shall under-
take a comprehensive study of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to determine
where equality is involved and where discrimination on the basis of sex is
directly or indirectly authorized or mandated therein.
Id.
3 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 386.
" 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 381 (emphasis added). The proposal is reprinted in note 62,
supra.
65 As compared to the original proposal, the actual amendments, 1974 Ky. Acts.
ch. 386, stated: "AN ACT relating to equal rights for men and women."
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old version, only the "wife" was given a tax exemption on
$10,000 of inherited property."6 Today, the "surviving spouse"
has a right to the exemption. 7
Generally, the LRC made the modification by changing
gender-oriented terms to status-oriented terms. Thus the word
"wife" was changed to "spouse,"68 and the designations "male"
and "woman" were changed to "person."69 By replacing the
gender-based classifications with the broader terminology, the
legislature has managed to minimize the discrimination inher-
ent in the old statutes. Although it is clear that the Kentucky
legislature is committed to formulating laws that treat all citi-
zens equally, 0 the divorce venue statute has yet to be changed.
Eliminating the preferential treatment accorded the wife under
this statute seems crucial if the state is to avoid a charge of
reverse discrimination.
"Reverse discrimination" in terms of racial equality has
received a great deal of attention in recent years.7 1 Although
reverse discrimination in terms of sexual equality has never
achieved a pitch of controversy akin to that of the DeFunis or
Bakke cases, 72 the United States Supreme Court has formu-
11 KRS § 140.080 (1971) (amended 1974), stated: "There shall be free from any
tax under the preceding provisions of this chapter the following inheritable interests:
(a) wife . . .$10,000; ....
,1 KRS § 140.080 (Supp. 1976): "(a) Surviving spouse, $20,000. . . ... Two of the
more interesting changes which operate to put men on equal footing with women are
contained in the statutes dealing with slander and specific tortious acts. Under a strict
construction of the slander statute before the revision, only a female had a cause of
action against someone who accused her of incest, fornication or adultery. Now, "any
person" may institute such an action. KRS § 411.040 (Supp. 1976) (amended 1974).
Further, while actions for seduction were heretofore characterized in terms of a female
plaintiff, now the statute merely refers to the "victim" of the act. KRS § 411.030
(Supp. 1976) (amended 1974).
KRS § 18.212 (Supp. 1976) (dealing with rights of a disabled veteran's spouse).
" KRS § 37.170 (Supp. 1976) (providing for an active militia); KRS § 91.470
(Supp. 1976) (on the procedure for collecting unpaid taxes); and KRS § 402.210 (Supp.
1976) (dealing with parental permission for minors to marry).
70 See statement of the purpose of the change in note 62, supra. E.g., KRS § 95.440
(Supp. 1976) in which the qualifications for members of police and fire departments
are set forth. The recent revision struck out "male" and replaced it with "person."
"1 See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Regents of Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (U.S. June 28, 1978) (No. 76-811). See also NEWSWEEK, July
10, 1978.
72 For a discussion of recent reverse discrimination cases in the area of sex, see
Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse"
Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Erick-
1978]
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lated guidelines for determining when a particular law discrim-
inates against a person on the basis of sex so as to violate the
Equal Protection Clause.73 In constructing the tests to be ap-
plied when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged as a
denial of equal protection, the Supreme Court in McDonald v.
Board of Election Commissioners74 stated that:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will
be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause only
if based on reasons totally unrealted to the pursuit of that
goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitution-
ally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascer-
taining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their
statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds
can be conceived to justify them."
This statement of the law has come to be known as the tradi-
tional test.7
In Reed v. Reed,77 following McDonald, the Court broad-
ened the compelling state interest test by holding that "[a]
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some grounds of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike."78
It seems unlikely that the venue statute would withstand
analysis under the traditional, or "rational relationship" test
son]. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father's right to child
after mother's death: Supreme Court held Illinois statute barring fitness hearing vio-
lated father's rights); Friedrich v. Katz, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (New York
law requiring signature of parents on marriage license of man less than 21 years old
and of woman less than 18 years old was not violative of male plaintiff's constitutional
rights).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV reads in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;...
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
7, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Inmates of Cook County jail were denied absentee ballots
for a primary election by an Illinois statute. The Supreme Court held the statute was
constitutional.
Is Id. at 809.
71 Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
-' 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Is Id. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Reed
condemned an Idaho statute denying letters of estate administration to a woman where
there was a qualified man for the position.
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as formulated by the Supreme Court in McDonald and ex-
panded by Reed. In order for the wife in a divorce action to be
treated more favorably, or differently, than the husband, the
state would have to demonstrate that there is a valid justifica-
tion for so doing, i.e., that the state has a legitimate purpose
for requiring that divorce suits be initiated in the county of the
wife's residence.
The enactment of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act
is the clearest indication that the Kentucky legislature in-
tended to equalize the status of both parties in a divorce action.
The old presumptions that the husband was financially su-
perior to the wife, that the wife provided a more stable envi-
ronment for the raising of children, or that the wife's proprie-
tary interests needed greater protection have all been legisla-
tively negated by the act.
Why, then, should the wife, who may not even be initiating
the divorce, be given the benefit of having the suit brought
where it is most convenient for her? It would appear that the
legislature's answer to such a question would not satisfy the
criteria proposed by the Supreme Court under the traditional
test.
Although in 1973, a majority of the court declined to in-
clude sex in the category of suspect classifications requiring
strict scrutiny," lower federal courts in Kentucky have seem-
ingly grasped at language in the opinion" to require strict scru-
1, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Frontiero judgment, reversing
the lower court, was a majority decision. However, only three of the justices, Mr.
Justice White, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall concurred with Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion that sex is a suspect classification. Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring in the judgment, based his opinion strictly on discrimination grounds.
Mr. Justice Powell's opinion, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black-
mun concurred, stated:
It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect
classification with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding. Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which. . . supports our decision today, did not
add sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently
suspect.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-97 (1973).
The Supreme Court has not deemed it necessary to expand its position in subse-
quent sex discrimination cases.
For a critical view of the Court's failure to hold sex a suspect classification see
Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 235
(1975).
" For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973), it was
stated:
19781
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66
tiny for statutes based upon sexual classifications."1 In
Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky
University, 2 the court applied the compelling state interest
test and found that regulations imposing dormitory curfews
and other restrictions on female students but not on male stu-
dents were proper because the safety of the female students was
a legitimate concern of the University. 3 In contrast,; the Court
in Johnston v. Hodges4 held that no compelling state interest
was furthered by a statute which required the father's signa-
ture on a minor child's drivers license application. The statute
was thus voided as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.85
Because the compelling state interest test is more exacting
than the traditional test, it is very doubtful that the divorce
venue statute could withstand a constitutional challenge under
this test, should it be applied. While it is clear that the statute
once served an important state purpose-protection of women
from a financial hardship they were not prepared to bear-this
state interest is no longer valid in view of the changed economic
status of women today. As one court pointed out, "Forty per-
cent of the American work force is female. Over 57% of all
American women between the ages of 20 and 24, and 45% of
those between 25 and 34, are in the wage earning work force."86
And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statues as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform
or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to
inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members.
The case dealt with a woman in the armed forces who claimed her husband as a
dependent. The Supreme Court struck down the law, prohibiting this action as a
violation of the plaintiff's equal protection rights.
11 In Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707, 710 (6th Cir. 1973), the court
said: "The test, which becomes applicable when a fundamental right of the aggrieved
party is at issue or a suspect classification . . . is used, requires that to justify the
classification, the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest."
See also Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974). In the Johnston
decision, however, the court acknowledged that the judicial attitude towards the
"compelling state interest" test has not been entirely uniform. Id. at 1018 nn. 11, 12,
& 13.
- 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 710.
372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
Id. at 1020.
Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 (E.D. La. 1973), quoted in Johnston
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Therefore it is clearly arguable that the state's interest-the
assumption that women as a class are incapable of assuming a
greater financial responsibility-is no longer valid today.87 Nei-
ther does it seem likely that the divorce venue statute may be
defended on the basis of administrative convenience. In
Johnston, the state argued that administrative hardships
would result if either parent were allowed to give consent for
their child's drivers license. The Court categorically rejected
that argument, quoting the United States Supreme Court:
[O]ur prior decisions make clear that although efficacious
administration of government programs is not without some
importance, "the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency . . ." And when we enter the realm of
"strict judicial scrutiny," there can be no doubt that
"administrative convenience" is not a shibboleth, the mere
recitation of which dictates constitutionality."
Further, it is unclear whether the current venue statute
actually does promote administrative convenience. As the
cases demonstrate, there is often confusion and delay as the
county of the wife's actual residence is determined. 9
Venue statutes have been infrequently challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause,"0 but a general rule as to their
validity has been formulated:
Classifications for purposes of venue may be based upon the
nature of the litigants as corporations or natural persons, or
v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
0 And if women are no longer financially dependent, they should no longer be
accorded preferential treatment. "There is no constitutional right for any [sex] to be
preferred. The years of [living under common law disabilities] did more than retard
the progress of [women]. Even a greater wrong was done to [men] by creating
arrogance instead of humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior
[sex]. There is no superior person by constitutional standards." Erickson, supra note
72, at 17 n.82.
M Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015, 1019-20 (E.D. Ky. 1974), (quoting
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
n See discussion of this factor in text accompanying notes 50 through 55, supra.
" Professor Petrilli suggests that the reason the venue statute has never been
seriously challenged is because Kentucky is not a large state and the inconvenience to
the husband is minimal. Telephone conversation with Professor Petrilli (Oct. 10, 1977).
But see hypothetical posed by the author in note 56 supra. See also McClung v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 214 S.W. 193 (Mo. 1919), where a venue statute which dis-
criminated against a corporation was held invalid.
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upon the basis of the non-residence of a party, or upon the
type of action involved: the test is whether there is any rea-
sonable and adequate basis for the classification made. One
which is arbitrary and burdensome may violate guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky statute which limits venue in divorce ac-
tions to the county of the wife's residence is arbitrary and bur-
densome. It no longer serves the function for which it was de-
signed; it is contrary to the general principles of venue used by
the other states; and it arguably violates the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying the husband the equal protection of
the laws. For these reasons the statute should be reformed to
equalize the status of the parties in a divorce suit. The most
equitable solution would be to allow a divorce action to be
initiated in the county where either the plaintiff or the defen-
dant resides.
Richard D. Simms
, 77 AM. JUR. 2d Venue § 3 (1975).
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